Popular discourses about Islam don’t normally include the ‘service’ component of the faith. Even though Islam considers charity to be central part of faith. Charity is very broadly defined in Islamic terms – for instance, there are prophetic Hadith that suggest that even a kind word or smile to a stranger can be considered an act of charity. Given this, how are we to understand contemporary discourses of volunteering, service within the context of Islam. And how can we make sense of the service component of movements like the Hizmet movement (also known as the Gulen movement)? This was the central discussion that was part of Prof. Pim Valkenberg’s talk at the Rumi Forum, yesterday.
His book titled Renewing Islam by Service is an investigation into why the volunteers who serve people through the Hizmet movement do so. Seems like a simple question to answer, but the answers that he found surprised Valkenberg.
Valkenberg spoke of the impressive volunteering done by the Hizmet movement followers. He said “I quickly realized that this is called Hizmet movement (volunteers) rather than Gulen movement, because even though it was inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gulen, he is really not the center of attention.” Mr.Gulen would rather people focus on the groups or cemaats of volunteers. Speaking of his own interest and how he came to study the movement in Europe, he said that his earlier interactions with students who were part of this movement were his first introduction. This motive of working for the ‘pleasure of Allah’ was the interpretive key to understanding the work of the Gulen movement volunteers, he pointed out. He pointed out to the massive amount of charity that occurs during Ramadhan and also throughout the year, among Turks as an illustration of this charity. The current efforts of the Turkish government to rehabilitate the Syrians can be (broadly speaking) understood from this perspective of hospitality for the stranger.
While most narratives of revival or reform of Islam usually center on discussions of Islamism or political Islam, this perspective of looking at practices to reexamine Islam is an interesting one. It was refreshing to hear Valkenberg address the theological understanding of charity among the members of Gulen movement. Several scholars, religious preachers and reformers have addressed this question of reform. Among the more controversial manifestations of this ‘reform’ is Salafism, which seems to get a lot of bad press. While politics and religion get entangled in this debate, Volkenberg’s work suggests that it is possible to focus on the ethical and religious dimensions of these practices, while examining why these volunteers do what they do.
Their very public charity and manifestation of their values may seem controversial in a society such as the U.S., given the discomfort many have about talking about religion in public, but Volkenberg doesn’t see this as a problem. “As a Catholic, I also see that there is role for religion in addressing public issues, so I am all for movements like the Hizmet movement,” he said; arguing that perhaps Christians can learn something from such groups.
During my own visit to Turkey 2007, I saw large volunteer groups raising money for charity. I have also been consistently impressed with the scale as well as commitment to service among the Turkish diaspora I have encountered in India and the U.S. This book will certainly add to our understanding of the motivations, both religious and civic, among the Hizmet movement followers.
I recently came across an article about the Ottoman Empire’s aid to Ireland during the great Potato Famine[i] in the 1840s. The article points out that the Ottoman sultan, Sultan Khaleefah Abdul-Majid I declared his intention to send £10,000 to aid Ireland’s farmers. However, the British did not like this idea and even forced the ships that had food and other aid to take a diversion, before they could reach Ireland. This little known fact in history not only challenges our assumption about Humanitarian aid’s origins – it is assumed that World War I was the precursor to global humanitarian aid, as we know it – and also challenges us to re-think ideas of cooperation between ‘nations,’ before ‘nation-states’ emerged.
This inspiring story of aid from a Muslim country to a predominantly Catholic nation is not only a great example of ecnumenism in history, but also an example of how creatively people in the past (and in the present day, as well) think of charity as a great leveler between people. Charity can not only expand boundaries of cooperation, build goodwill; but also aid in ‘soft-power’ as we know it. With this example, one is forced to ask: are our ideas of the evolution of international humanitarianism in the West – in particular, in the development of Red Cross Movement in the 19th century – in need of revision? Second, a related question: Do we also need to re-think the supposed benefits of this ‘aid,’ and question whether it is beneficial, in all cases?
In my own research on religious and ethnic based giving in the U.S., I have seen examples of what Amy Singer in her book Charity in Islamic Societies (2008) has called a ‘Mixed-economy of charity,’ meaning a collaboration between wealthy individuals, government as well as groups of organizations or NGOs addressing specific issues. Private Foundations have become important, especially in the modern era, with the rise of mega-millionaires and billionaires, who have enormous amounts of disposable incomes. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Ford Foundation and others like these have contributed enormously to addressing issues of global health, poverty and education. While their impact is also questioned by those who call into question the manner in which they work, the power-relations between them and the local governments/ recipients; it is an empirical reality that they have an impact, which for the most part is helping address some key challenges in these regions. However, this narrative is clearly one-sided and reinforces our stereotypes of the ‘under-developed,’ third-world, in need of constant attention and ‘help,’ from the West. While true to a limited extent, this narrative of ‘development,’ assistance does not take into account the local efforts, resources and strategies that are being deployed by local organizations and foundations in the countries where they operate. Can this example of Ottoman generosity in the 19th century help us re-think this narrative?
We are certainly living in an inter-connected world, where flow of capital, people and ideas is truly global. But this globalized view of the world does put in place certain dynamics of power and discourses of how and who needs ‘help,’ that can skew the ‘reality,’ of what is going on, in our world. As critical theorists like Arturo Escobar in Encountering Development (1996) and others have pointed out, this ‘development narrative,’ needs a close examination. I would suggest that we re-examine this narrative with the perspective of those who are at the ‘receiving end,’ of the beneficence or generosity, rather than the one who is doing the donating. This discourse, Escobar argues has led to the ‘debt crisis, massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression.’ (p.4). While I do not share his pessimism fully, I do think that we need to re-think the amount of ‘good,’ that discourse of aid, development etc. The promise of aid must be measured in real terms, in terms of the impacts that it has had on the people it supposedly serves.
Escobar places this dynamic in the politics of ‘representation,’ and argues that there has been a ‘colonization of reality,’ using Orientalism, Africanism and Developmentalism – three strategies to represent the ‘developing,’ world. The ways that the under-developed world is supposed to ‘develop,’ have been defined, outlined and strategized by ‘experts,’ who wield inordinate power in terms of defining the discourse. The problem with this is that the Western discourses do not take into account (in most cases) the local dynamics, cultural knowledge systems and ways of organizing life, which may not fit the epistemology of the West. Local forms of philanthropy, charity and solidarity – through faith-based giving or ethnic solidarity and mobilization could be considered another area where there needs to be greater appreciation and lesser ‘intervention.’
Finally, on a related note, I think a better understanding of faith-based giving can also help us tackle some of the assumptions we have about what this form of giving can and cannot do. While it is preposterous to assume that faith-based giving can ‘fix all our problems,’ it would be imprudent to also shut it out of the public sphere, for fear of contaminating the ‘secular,’ public sphere with religious values. Given that our world is witnessing a ‘return to religion,’ as Jonathan Benthall has called it; with greater religious symbolism in the public sphere, it would be wise to accept this reality and manage the consequences of how this philanthropy can play out.
As regards Islamic philanthropy, while one Caliphate in the Middle East (ISIS) claims to be ‘Islamic,’ yet, commits acts that are clearly anti-Islamic in spirit and form; there is a much better example in the Ottoman Empire, which did allow for the creative and productive use of charity and philanthropy. While by no means perfect, it did follow many of the common-sense principles that made life liveable for most of its citizens. A fact well attested to by scholars and beneficiaries of the aid to Ireland.
The ongoing contestations, protests and debates in Egypt, Turkey between the people and the leaders is being framed as one of clash of modernity vs. traditionalism. Enough ink has been spilled trying to explain how the Islamists (read those who believe there is space for Islam in the public sphere) are harmful, retrograde and generally bad for the country in question. While this fear of Islamists have some validity- in extreme cases such as the Taliban, on the whole, I believe this apprehension and fear about the “wave of Islamization,” in Egypt, Turkey is incorrect, exaggerated and at times blatantly wrong.
The government’s repression and tackling of protestors is quite another issue, and I will not get into that here. My point is to analyze the discourse surrounding the participation of Islamist parties in the public sphere. I believe that there is an exaggerated fear of these elements and also an Orientalist understanding of politics, that may well fall short of the kind of thinking needed to understand the role of Islam in the public sphere.
The debate about modernity and secularism is particularly important as various developments in the Muslim world are re-defining “modernity,” but this is not the definition of modernity that fits the western mould, as well-known Anthropologist and scholar of Islam, Talal Asad points out. The Arab Spring uprisings are an example of the kind of modernity that is bringing to power regimes which the western powers see as “pre-modern”. Egypt, Tunisia stand as examples of such developments, which are considered by many analysts and a few academics as NOT representative of modernity.
The classical definition of modernity and Secularism has the implicit notion of separation of Religion and Politics, but this does not neatly fit into the definition of how politics and life in general is conducted in many parts of the world. Asad points out that project of modernity in the Muslim world (and one can argue in many societies which are non-Muslim as well) that secularism and modernity should not be seen as exclusionary terms.
“Deprivatization of religion process depends on how religion becomes public. If it furthers democracy, as it did in Poland or promotes debate around liberal values, then it is entirely consistent with modernization,” says Talal Asad in Formations of the Secular[i]. Taking a cue from this, it seems that for Asad, modernity is not problematic, in so far as it is willing to embrace various versions of secularism and also makes space for religion in a manner which does not radically shift or distort societal balances.
“Modernity is a project or a series of projects that some of those in power seek to achieve…” and we forget that the notion of modernity in the west emerged at a time in history and there is an attempt from the Western powers to impose it on other societies. This is the reason there are so many problems in other parts of the world,” he adds. The fact that Asad believes that there cannot be one definition of Modernity, or Secularism or even Religion complicates matters for him and hence this can be a hegemonic discourse. This is often played out in discourses of belonging, national security and other areas impacting the state.
Elsewhere, Asad points out that he is very ambivalent and almost leery of the idea of modernity, since it presupposes just one form of modernity. In the introductory chapter of Formations of the Secular, he says:” Thus, although in France both the highly centralized state and its citizens are secular, in Britain the state is linked to the Established church and its inhabitants are largely nonreligious, and in America the population is largely religious but the federal state is secular…consequently, although the secularism in these three countries have much in common, the mediating character of the modern imaginary in each of them differs significantly.”
So, how is one to define Modernity? Doesn’t this view of modernity make it almost impossible to talk about Modernity or Secularism, in an objective sense? Perhaps not. Asad points out that: “The modern nation as an imagined constructed is mediated through imagined constructs, “says Asad in the introductory chapter. One of the main symbols used is that of Secularism, as all other identities and symbols are relegated to secondary importance. The mediating character of religious symbols varies in each society, he goes on to say and this is quite different even within the Western world. Take the US, France and Britain. While the US still has a significant population which believes in fundamentalist ideals and tries to influence polity, France is at a different spectrum and with its Laicite, is quite insular in its approach to religion in the public sphere.
But it is key to remember that there are constant negotiations going on in every society and no society is ever static. While the French are adamantly nationalistic and define Secular in a very rigid way, they still have Catholic Schools in which one can cover oneself (Veil) as one chooses. It’s a mistake to think of secular and religious in binary term, there are lots of cross-cultural connections and transmutations of concepts, modes of behavior and organization. Let’s now look at the notion of civil society and modernity, as being understood specifically in Turkey and Egypt.
Notions of civil society and modernity in Egypt
Among the several assumptions about the Middle East and North Africa are that “civil society,” must flourish in order for democratic institutions to take root. While this assumption has been challenged on several grounds, both religious and cultural, the fact remains that there are vibrant pockets of civil society – the sort of networks and alliances that make governance and accountability possible in many parts of the region.
Steven Cook recently wrote about the “Islamization,” of the newly formed democracies in an insightful article for the Atlantic, in which he says : “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers and Tunisia’s Ennahda have not declared alcohol forbidden, forced women to don the hijab, or instituted hudud punishments (i.e., specific punishments for specific crimes set forth in the Qur’an or hadiths). It was big news in Egypt several weeks ago when the Le Roi Hotel in the Red Sea resort of Hurghada poured out all its alcohol and established a female-only floor and swimming pool, but only because there have been so few incidents along these lines — observers tend to forget that what was Cairo’s Grand Nile Tower (formerly the Hyatt) went dry well before anyone ever contemplated Hosni Mubarak’s ignominious fall.” He clarifies what he means by “Islamized,” by adding: “By grounding certain institutions in Islamic tenets, Islamist elites create an environment in which religion plays a greater role in society, including in areas that have not been directly Islamized.” Implicit in this line of reasoning is that this is somehow bad, evil and inimical to the interests of minorities, although, there is very little proof to that effect.
As a proof to show that the country is Islamizing, he cites a new amendment to the December 2012 constitution: “Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology, and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.” While this may seem true, it is a fact that given the strange relationship of the Ulema ( religious scholars at Al-Azhar) and the ruling establishment, over the centuries, there has been a tension built in – one that neither gives them absolute say, nor authority. One must only remember that Mubarak quite literally managed Al-Azhar on his own terms and before him Sadat coopted the Ulema. If the country’s constitution says that Shari’ah is the source of law, doesn’t it make sense that the scholars of the most well-known university be consulted?
Speaking of Turkey’s reform efforts in Education, Steven Cook, in the same article, mentions : “In March 2012, for example,the AKP paved the way for graduates of imam-hatip (preacher) schools to enter the bureaucracy by making it easier for them to matriculate at Turkey’s universities — a traditional feeder for public servants. In the context of Turkish politics and the Republic’s history of aggressive laicisme, the change was controversial. Turkey’s preacher schools are, as their name implies, intended to train prayer leaders for Turkey’s 82,693 mosques and, as such, about half the curriculum is devoted to religious subjects while the remainder of the curriculum coincides with what the Ministry of National Education prescribes for non-religious high school students.” What he does not mention is that these schools were severely repressed by the state, during the Ataturk era and today form one of the examples of every local community’s efforts to educate its youngsters. Students in Imam hatip schools get both religious and secular education and learn to become constructive members of society. There is again, nothing inherently wrong with this, as Cook and several other secularists assume. If anything, this move to help the graduates of these schools enter the public service is an effort to integrate these graduates, who often are poor and come from modest backgrounds.
As Fazlur Rahman, the late scholar of Islam has astutely pointed out: “The great sign of hope is the restlessness and remarkable upward mobility of intellectual life in the new educational adventure of Islam in Turkey. This is an inherent quality of the Turkish character and accrues directly from the circumstance that Turkey is starting over with a clean slate after a deliberate and extended experiment with pure secular Westernization[ii].”
One must not forget that the economy grew tremendously under Mr.Erdogan and the religious resurgence seems to be a reaction to the decades of repression by the state. It is the will of people that is being demonstrated, through the elected representatives. Here is an article from The Economist, that points to the economic growth that came under Mr.Erdogan and the need for further stability in the country. It points out: “A key selling-point for Recep Tayyip Erdogan to voters is Turkey’s economic performance. After a volatile 1990s and a huge bust in 2001, his Justice and Development (AK) government has presided over steady high growth and modest inflation. In 2010 and 2011 the economy grew by a China-like 9%, leading to serious fears of overheating.” Despite, this there are serious concerns about the AKP and Mr.Erdogan’s religious leanings. Criticism of the ruling party often seems to be from a political or ideological stance, often not taking into account the historical progress of the country, and the social and religious conditions that have shaped it.
Here is an egregious example of bashing of Mr.Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey. While the writer fails to acknowledge that the Turkish economy grew rapidly under his leadership, he goes on to say that the has nothing to show, but the growth of the economy – as if economic miracles happen in vacuum, without any planning or critical evaluation of the direction in which the country should head.
There are very many credible and respect scholars who have made the claim that the notions of modernity, religion and secularism are all western constructs, that emerged in the West in a specific context, under very specific time-periods and they have become a lens for the western world to look at the world. It is wrong to assume that every civilization and country should abide by these and imposing this on others is akin to hegemony. Jose Casanova, Peter Berger, Talal Asad have all made similar (if not the exact same arguments) in their books and there is good reason to believe this is the case.
What is to be done?
In conclusion, what H.A.R. Gibb, the great Orientalist scholar said about the Muslim religious leaders of medieval times, can be said equally about their secular opponents, in contemporary times: ““Modernism is, therefore, predominantly a movement of thought among educated laymen, if we leave aside the neo-Hanbalite Manar-modernists. But how is its theological content to be assessed or defined? It seldom finds direct expression in books or articles, and though, it may be reflected in the arguments and polemics of the Ulema against the spread of Secularism, we may be sure that, in the invariable habit of preachers and polemists, they exaggerate, misrepresent and distort the opinion and activities of which they disapprove[iii].”
Perhaps, journalists, analysts and students should read a bit more about the processes of modernization, the critiques of the same and also sensitize themselves to the various debates in the field before passing any judgments. While it is true that modernity is a difficult, painful and often destructive process, it need not be so. Turkey and Egypt are in a unique position to define for the Muslim world what modernity in the 21st century looks like. And I believe they should do it on their own terms – not on terms defined by others.
[i] Asad, Talal. 2003, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity,Stanford, California: Stanford University Press
[ii] Rahman, Fazlur. 1982. Islam and Modernity. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
[iii] Gibb, H.A.R. 1947. Modern Trends in Islam, New York. Octagon Books. Pp.49.